nepal
Abstract
This study critically evaluates the potential transition of Nepal from a parliamentary to presidential system of governance, motivated by persistent political instability and frequent governmental transformation under the current framework. Employing a mixed-method approach, this study synthesizes qualitative insights from case studies of the United States (presidential system) and Sri Lanka (semi-presidential system) and analyzes Nepal’s constitutional and political dynamics. Key findings suggest that a presidential system characterized by executive legislative separation, direct electoral mandates, and fixed terms could moderate Nepal’s governance challenges by reducing legislative gridlock and ensuring policy continuity. However, risks, such as authoritarian drift and accountability deficits, necessitate robust constitutional safeguards. The paper concludes that, while a presidential system offers structural advantages for stability, its success in Nepal depends on contextual adaptations and institutional checks to balance executive presidential authority with democratic accountability.
Keywords: Presidential system, parliamentary system, Nepal, political stability, comparative governance, semi-presidentialism, executive power.
Introduction
Since Nepal transitioned to a democratic system, political instability has plagued the nation, with no governing party managing to complete a full five-year term under the 2015 constitution.This political volatility has led to frequent changes in government, hindering the implementation of long-term policies and development projects crucial for the nation’s progress. The constant power struggles and coalition breakdowns have not only eroded public trust in the democratic process but have also impeded Nepal’s ability to address pressing socio-economic challenges and maintain consistent foreign relations. The frequent changes in government have also resulted in a lack of policy continuity, with each new administration often abandoning or modifying the initiatives of its predecessors. This instability has created an environment of uncertainty for both domestic and foreign investors, potentially hampering economic growth and job creation in Nepal. Furthermore, the constant political turmoil has diverted attention and resources away from critical issues such as poverty alleviation, infrastructure development, and disaster preparedness, leaving the country vulnerable to both internal and external challenges. Parliamentary breakdowns, failed coalition ships, and issues between the executive and legislative branches underscore flaws within the parliamentary system. This study seeks to determine whether switching to a presidential system – a government system with an elected executive serving a predetermined term – could help solve the identified problems. This study seeks to resolve these two fundamental questions by employing comparative case studies and applying explanatory concepts. What changes are associated with the reduction of political instability in a country with a presidential versus parliamentary system? What particular context creates the conditional effectiveness of the presidential system in Nepal?
Literature Review
The literature review examines the structural features of the presidential system, theoretical debates, and comparative insights to contextualize its potential applicability in Nepal. A presidential system is defined by a constitutionally independent executive, legislative, and judiciary, with a directly elected president serving as both the head of the state and the government (Cheibub, 2007). Key characteristics include separation of powers, checks and balances (e.g., presidential veto and legislative override), fixed presidential terms, and direct popular mandates, which scholars argue enhance legitimacy, decision-making efficiency, and stability compared to parliamentary systems. The U.S. model exemplifies these dynamics, where executive authority is counterbalanced by judicial and legislative oversight, as seen in Supreme Court rulings that emphasize plenary legislative processes (U.S. Supreme Court, 1983).
Proponents highlight advantages, such as institutional stability, reduced executive dependency on legislative confidence votes, and clearer accountability to voters (Cheibub, 2007). Critics, however, caution against the risks of authoritarian drift if checks are weak and stress the role of political culture in shaping governance outcomes (Rushkoff 1983). Åberg and Sedelius (2018) further note a scholarly bias toward European cases, underscoring the need for studies in diverse contexts like South Asia, where historical, cultural, and demographic factors differ markedly.
Nepal’s post2063 B.S. transition from monarchy to federal democratic republic frames the inquiry. Existing literature lacks an analysis of how a presidential system might address Nepal’s ethnic diversity, geographic fragmentation, and historical centralization. While Nepal’s current parliamentary system incorporates power-sharing mechanisms, debates persist regarding its efficacy in ensuring stability and inclusion. The “basic structure doctrine” in Nepal’s constitution, which prevents absolute power concentration, raises questions about adapting a presidential model without undermining pluralism.
The review identifies critical gaps: (1) limited empirical focus on presidential systems in heterogeneous, post-conflict societies; (2) insufficient attention to how Nepal’s unique sociopolitical fabric, marked by caste, ethnicity, and regional disparities, might interact with presidentialism’s majoritarian tendencies; and (3) the absence of comparative studies referencing countries with analogous challenges (e.g., Indonesia, Nigeria). This study addresses these gaps by evaluating Nepal’s feasibility through the dual lens of institutional design and sociopolitical context, offering insights into governance stability in transitioning democracies.
Methodology
A mixed-methods design combines qualitative case studies and document analysis. The primary data included semi-structured interviews with 15 Nepali policymakers and legal experts. Secondary data draws from constitutional texts, historical records, and peer-reviewed analyses of the U.S. and Sri Lankan systems. Thematic analysis identifies patterns in governance outcomes, while comparative frameworks assess institutional adaptability in Nepal’s context.
Comparative Analysis: Presidential Systems in Practice
United States: Full Presidential System
The U.S. presidential system, characterized by strict separation of powers and checks and balances, offers insights into governance stability through the constitutional independence of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The president, directly elected via a state-based Electoral College, serves a fixed four-year term, insulated from legislative confidence votes, ensuring executive continuity. However, this stability contrasts with accountability gaps, as citizens cannot prematurely remove an unpopular president except through impeachment, a rare, politically fraught process reserved for severe misconduct. The president’s authority as both the head of the state and government includes commanding the military and overseeing federal agencies, counterbalanced by Congress’s lawmaking and budgetary powers, and the judiciary’s constitutional review. While bicameralism (House and Senate) and judicial appointments foster deliberation, the winnertakeall Electoral College risks a disjuncture between popular and electoral outcomes, potentially undermining representational legitimacy. For Nepal, this model highlights tradeoffs: fixed terms and separation of powers could mitigate parliamentary instability and factionalism, yet majoritarian electoral mechanics and centralized executive authority may clash with Nepal’s multiethnic federal structure, where consensus building and proportional representation are critical. The U.S. system’s reliance on institutional checks, rather than parliamentary-style coalitional accountability, underscores the need for robust safeguards against authoritarian drift in culturally diverse democracies.
Key features—direct presidential elections, veto powers, and judicial oversight—ensure accountability. However, partisan gridlock, as seen in budget shutdowns, reveals systemic inefficiencies in polarized environments (Howell & Moe, 2020).
Sri Lanka: SemiPresidential Experiment
Sri Lanka’s semi-presidential system, established under its 1978 Constitution, blends presidential dominance with parliamentary elements, offering lessons on executivelislative dynamics and governance risk. The directly elected president serves as the head of the state, commanderinchief, and head of government, wielding expansive powers—appointing ministers, dissolving parliament, and influencing judicial appointments. Despite constitutional provisions for parliamentary accountability, the president’s legal immunities, authority to assign ministerial portfolios, and emergency powers often overshadow the prime minister’s role, reducing Parliament to a “timid organ” in practice. While the 2015 19th Amendment introduced term limits and nominal checks, the system remained skewed toward presidential supremacy, particularly during crises, as seen in the president’s ability to override legislation via emergency regulations.
In Nepal, Sri Lanka’s model underscores the risks of concentrated executive authority in ethnically diverse post-conflict states. The semi-presidential structure theoretically allows power-sharing between a president and prime minister, yet Sri Lanka’s experience reveals pitfalls: weak legislative oversight, centralization of decision-making, and diminished judicial independence. Nepal’s federal, multi-ethnic context—demanding consensus and decentralized governance—contrasts with Sri Lanka’s unitary framework, where presidential dominance exacerbated ethnic tensions and institutional distrust. The absence of concrete mechanisms to enforce presidential accountability to the Parliament further highlights the vulnerabilities to authoritarian drift. This analysis suggests that, while hybrid systems may offer flexibility, their success hinges on rigorous checks, balanced power distribution, and cultural political alignment—key considerations for Nepal in evaluating executive models that balance stability with inclusivity.
Sri Lanka’s hybrid system, post-2015 reforms, reduced presidential dominance but introduced executive-prime ministerial conflicts, undermining policy coherence (Edrisinha, 2020). This case underscores the risks of ambiguous power-sharing in transitional democracies.
Republics with a Presidential System of Government
Presidential systems are practiced across a diverse array of countries, including Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United States, reflecting various political, cultural, and historical contexts. In Latin America (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, and Chile), presidentialism has often coexisted with challenges such as authoritarian legacies, military interventions, and populist leadership, underscoring the system’s vulnerability to centralized power without robust checks. In contrast, countries such as Costa Rica and South Korea demonstrate how institutional safeguards, independent judiciaries, and term limits can stabilize presidential democracies. African nations, such as Nigeria and Kenya, highlight tensions between ethnopolitical fragmentation and executive dominance, where presidential systems risk exacerbating patronage networks and exclusion. Meanwhile, Indonesia and the Philippines reveal hybrid outcomes: while Indonesia’s post-Suharto presidency balances decentralization and pluralism, the Philippines grapples with populist authoritarianism under its presidential framework. Notably, several states (e.g., Belarus, Iran, Sudan) illustrate how presidential systems can devolve into de facto dictatorships when constitutional checks are eroded. This global mosaic underscores that presidentialism’s success hinges not merely on structural design but on complementary factors—political culture, judicial independence, and legislative accountability—critical considerations for Nepal, where ethnic diversity and postconflict federalism demand a system resilient to both centralization and fragmentation.
Nepal’s Governance Challenges and Institutional Fit
Although designed for inclusivity, Nepal’s parliamentary system has enabled factionalism and short-term governance. These examples highlight the importance of robust institutional safeguards and a strong democratic culture to prevent the concentration of power in presidential systems. Nepal’s case further illustrates the complex interplay between governance structures and societal factors, emphasizing the need for a system that can balance diverse interests while maintaining stability and accountability.
Nepal’s unique context, characterized by ethnic diversity and a recent transition to federalism, presents distinct challenges for institutional design. The current shortcomings of parliamentary systems in fostering long-term governance and mitigating factionalism underscore the need for careful consideration of alternative models that can address these issues while preserving democratic principles and inclusivity. Interviews revealed a consensus that frequent noconfidence motions and coalition bargaining divert focus from development agendas. A presidential system could streamline decision-making but risks marginalizing Nepal’s multiethnic constituencies. Respondents emphasized the need for decentralized authority and judicial safeguards to prevent executive overreach.
Discussion
The analysis suggests that a presidential system can stabilize Nepal’s governance by insulating the executive from legislative volatility. However, lessons from Sri Lanka highlight the necessity for clear constitutional delineations between executive, legislative, and judicial roles. The potential benefits of a presidential system in Nepal must be carefully weighed against the risks of concentrating power and undermining democratic representation. While streamlined decision-making could accelerate development initiatives, robust checks and balances are crucial to prevent authoritarian tendencies and ensure that the interests of diverse ethnic groups are protected. Decentralization of authority to the local level may help address concerns about marginalization under a strong central executive.
Careful constitutional design is essential if Nepal transitioned to a presidential model. Provisions for an independent judiciary, legislative oversight mechanisms, and protection of minority rights could help mitigate the dangers of executive overreach. Additionally, incorporating elements of proportional representation or federalism could preserve the multiparty character of Nepal’s democracy, while providing greater governmental stability. Contextual adaptationssuch as proportional representation in legislatures and independent anticorruption bodiesare critical for balancing stability with inclusivity.
Conclusion
A comparative analysis of presidential and semi-presidential systems underscores both the potential and pitfalls of adopting a presidential model in Nepal. While the U.S. system demonstrates how checks and balances can stabilize governance through executive-legislative separation and fixed terms, its majoritarian electoral mechanics and accountability gaps highlight the risks for Nepal’s multiethnic society. Sri Lanka’s semi-presidential experiment further warned of authoritarian drift when executive dominance overshadows parliamentary and judicial accountability. Nepal’s unique context—marked by ethnic diversity, federalism, and a history of political fragmentation—demands a governance model that balances centralized decision making with inclusive representation. A presidential system tailored to incorporate proportional representation, decentralized authority, and robust constitutional safeguards could mitigate the chronic instability of Nepal’s parliamentary framework. However, success hinges on preventing executive overreach through mechanisms such as legislative veto overrides, independent judicial reviews, and mandatory power-sharing arrangements with subnational governments.
Further Suggestions
To ensure a successful transition, Nepal must prioritize context-specific institutional designs. First, adopting a two-round presidential election system would guarantee majority legitimacy while accommodating regional and ethnic diversity. Second, decentralizing executive authority through constitutionally mandated power sharing between the president and prime minister (if a hybrid model is adopted) and provincial governments could prevent centralization and foster inclusivity. Third, strengthening legislative oversight, such as requiring supermajorities to override presidential vetoes and empowering parliamentary committees to scrutinize executive actions, would enhance accountability. Fourth, establishing an independent anti-corruption body with the authority to investigate the executive branch could curb the abuse of power. Finally, Nepal should invest in civic education and political dialogue to build public consensus on constitutional reforms, ensuring that marginalized communities participate in shaping the new system. Future research should explore hybrid models, such as a “constrained presidential system, ” with ceremonial prime minister or vice-presidential roles reserved for underrepresented groups, to address Nepal’s pluralism. Comparative studies with countries such as Indonesia and South Africa, which balance presidentialism with multi-ethnic governance, could offer additional insights. Ultimately, Nepal’s constitutional reforms must be iterative, allowing for adjustments based on evolving political dynamics and societal needs to achieve lasting stability without sacrificing democratic values.
Author- Ram Sundar Khaitu, Ph.D. Scholar
References
Adhikari, P. (2018). Political Instability in Nepal: Causes and Consequences. Kathmandu: Himalayan Press.
Åberg, J. & Sedelius, T. (2018). “A Structured Review of SemiPresidential Studies: Debates, Results and Missing Pieces.” British Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 1–20.
Baral, L. (2020). “Reforming Nepal’s Governance: A Case for Presidentialism.” Asian Journal of Political Science 28(3), 345–360.
Cambridge: Cheibub, J. A. (2007). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Cambridge University Press.
Edrisinha, R. (2020). “Sri Lanka’s SemiPresidential Dilemma.” Constitutional Reform Journal, 12(2), 45–67.
Horowitz, D. (1990). “Comparing Democratic Systems.” Journal of Democracy, 1(4), 73–79.
Oxford: Lawoti, M. (2017). Constitutional design in post-conflict Nepal. Oxford University Press.
Linz, J. (1990). “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy, 1(1), 51–69.
Rehnquist, W. H. (1992). Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson. William Morrow & Co.
